UCD, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland | Director: Professor Liam Kennedy
UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies
Belfield House
University College, Dublin
Tel: +353 1 716156
Transatlantic Affairs is a bimonthly newsletter designed to provide a succinct synthesis of contemporary 'must read’ articles emanating from a variety of sources dealing with current transatlantic socio-political and economic events. The newsletter is divided into three sections, Ireland and the United States, the United States and the European Union and the United States in an international context.
Niall O’ Dowd
With conflict in Northern Ireland subsiding, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, one of the largest Irish organizations in America is shifting its focus to pro-life issues. In a recent statement, Jack Meehan, the organizations national president declared, “we must reenergize ourselves to fight the scourge of abortion in the same steadfast manner that we used to fight the many injustices wreaked upon Catholic/ Nationalists in Northern Ireland.”
The editorial piece disagrees with the decision of the organization. “There is nothing wrong at all with seeking a right to life agenda, but it is also one shared with hundreds of other organizations, many of them far better equipped for that fight.”
And while the issue of Northern Ireland can be sidelined somewhat, much remains to be done regarding “the major issue of the future of Irish coming to America, and those already here in undocumented status.”
Without doubt, the resources of the AOH would be better placed tackling these important issues. Notwithstanding, Michael Cummings of the AOH argues that “What we want to do is to demonstrate that we can provide support and resources for those women who are faced with problem pregnancies or with difficult choices, and hopefully defend the right of the unborn by giving the practical assistance those women need.”
Although for some a laudable cause - in the context of the all-male AOH - this statement is somewhat peculiar. Moreover, it can be argued that this new focus reshapes the organization into a Catholic grouping rather than primarily Irish organization.
According to the Irishvoice piece, the AOH should not be so hasty to shift its goals from Northern Ireland and the Irish. After all, this is where the group has been most effective. Furthermore, given the level of work still to be done in Northern Ireland to secure the peace and boost economic growth perhaps the AOH should not embark on a new course just yet.
Information for this article was taken from www.irishabroad.com: “AOH Takes a Wrong Step, January 14, 2008
Richard N. Haass
The conventional view holds that transatlantic relations are on the mend. Germany and France elected pro-American leaders in recent years, Iraq is no longer such a divisive issue and the Bush administration has diluted its hard stand on many important international issues. According to Richard Haass however the belief that the wounds are healing is “comforting, but …is bound to end in disappointment.”
The reality is that America and Europe have grown apart on several issues of previous mutual concern. Indeed, within the post-Cold War international structure it becomes less likely Europe and America can ever achieve the level of cooperation that once defined the partnership.
Within the transatlantic block “social differences, including an unequal emphasis on religion and differing views on abortion rights and the death penalty; lingering anti-Americanism resulting from the Iraq war, perceived US neglect of the Palestinian issue…and generational and demographic changes on both sides of the ocean,”
have produced division within the alliance. As Haass writes, “Fewer Europeans regard American as their liberators; fewer Americans view Europeans as their ancestors.”
In the international arena the nature of alliances has changed sufficiently to weaken the relationship. The Cold War transatlantic alliance required a“predictability: of threat, outlook and obligations.”
In the twenty-first century these shared characteristics no longer exist. Accepting the new international environment is a recognition that Europe can and does disagree at times with America and as such the US is no longer in a position to count on the support of its traditional ally. This supposition appears to neglect historical reality however. Throughout the cold war the transatlantic relationship was never as smooth in practice as the rhetoric or revisionist history suggests. Putting that point aside however Haass continues to outline a future in which America will have to adopt a strategy of selective alliances, depending on the issue or problem to be addressed. In short, “transatlantic co-operation will be less predictable and more selective.”
For Haass, this new set of circumstances is not all bad for the U.S. though. In the new international structure “one-time opponents may become limited partners”
such as Beijing’s assistance in solving North Korea’s nuclear capacity. Of course, it will mean that America will have to place “a premium on consultation and coalition-building;”
a much more difficult task in the practice of foreign relations.
Haass, Richard “The Atlantic Becomes a Little Wider”, A Council on Foreign Relations Publication. Available on the Internet at www.cfr.org
The German Marshall Fund
On November 14, 2007, the German Marshall Fund held a senior level meeting aimed at outlining the results of the first meeting of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). In addition, the meeting addressed forthcoming challenges and opportunities for the TEC. The TEC was created in April 2007 by EU and US leaders to foster transatlantic economic cooperation. The Transatlantic Economic Council is designed “to strengthen joint EU/American action on reducing regulatory barriers to trade, protecting intellectual property rights, ensuring secure trade, integrating financial markets, promoting innovation and technology and encouraging investment.”
Together the European Union and the United States account for 60 percent of world Gross Domestic Product and 40 percent of global trade, making it the largest and most important trading alliance in the world. The first issue discussed was competitive regulatory standards. It was noted that at the core of the alliance’s economic competitiveness is the need for regulatory synchronisation. According to Angelos Pangratis, deputy head of the EU commission delegation to the US, “the two trading partners have understood that competitive regulatory approaches may restrict rather than foster economic growth and that common standards are needed in order to stay competitive in the global economy.”
Kathryn Hauser, U.S. executive director of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, recognized a changed atmosphere in the attitude toward transatlantic economic cooperation in Europe and America. According to Hauser, “the distinctive aspect differentiating the TEC from past efforts is the extensive process of consultation that not only included the private sector, but has also raised the profile of consumer group interests and legislators during the discussions.”
For Bernard Welschke, president of the Representative of German Industry and Trade, “the harmonization of accounting standards, secure trade, and issues related to patent recognition and intellectual property rights are of the highest importance for the European private sector.”
John Cobau of the U.S. National Security Council highlighted the Bush administration’s improved commitment to transatlantic economic cooperation. On trade security issues, he announced that the American government and European commission had “agreed to develop effective and mutually acceptable solutions to secure cargo trade.”
Against this background, both parties have undertaken a road-map “setting out the key performance-based stages required to reach mutual recognition of U.S. and EU Customs Trade partnership programs in 2009.”
The German Marshall Fund “Opportunities and Challenges for the Transatlantic Economic Council,” November 14, 2007. Available on the Internet at www.gmfus.org
John J. Mearsheimer
International affairs expert and co-author of the Jewish Lobby John J. Mearsheimer has produced an illuminating but worrisome editorial piece in The Oregonian last weekend (January 13, 2008). At its core, the argument extrapolates the nuances of the U.S.-Israeli diplomatic and economic relationship and contends that the pattern of traditional American unconditional support for Israel is bad for America and bad for Israel. Mearsheimer uses the forthcoming presidential contest as the context for his argument.
Each candidate, whether Democrat or Republican, favours continuing the policy of providing Israel with more than 3 billion dollars in foreign aid each year while asking nothing in return. Moreover, none of the Presidential hopefuls has criticized Israeli conduct in any respect. According to Mearsheimer, this pandering is not a surprise. American politics is infused with special interest groups that have both financial clout and access to media organization. In other words, these groups can be extremely useful or potentially hazardous to a candidate’s prospect for election. And the Israel Lobby is one of the strongest interests groups in American politics. Thus, “[p]oliticians do not want to offend Jewish Americans or “Christian Zionists,” two groups that are deeply engaged in the political process.”
So, what does all this mean for Israel? Mearsheimer argues that in adopting a policy of unconditional support “These candidates…are no friends of Israel.” In fact, “[t]hey are facilitating its pursuit of self-destructive policies that no true friend would favor.”
The central issue facing Israel at the moment surrounds the future of Gaza and the West Bank (both territories Israel conquered in 1967). Will Israel work toward a two-state solution, or will it opt for retaining a military control over these occupied regions. The reality, according to Mearsheimer, is that if Israel chooses to retain military control of the Gaza and West Bank then this will lead to an apartheid state. Indeed, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested this in a recent statement. Israel will “face a South African-style struggle”
if it rejects the two-state option. Hence, surely any friend of Israel would be vocally supporting the two-state option as a way of obtaining peace in the region.
In sum, the most recent presidential hopefuls are comparable to most American politicians. They “reflexively mouth pro-Israel platitudes while continuing to endorse and subsidize policies that are in fact harmful to the Jewish state.”
For Mearsheimer, a real ally would tell Israel that it is pursuing bad polices and furthermore, would undertake and support efforts to reshape those polices.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Candidates’ Unconditional Support Isn’t Right for Jewish State,” January 13, 2008, The Oregonian. Available on the Internet at www.commondreams.org
G. John Ikenberry
One prominent school of thought in international affairs contends that the rise of China will herald the end of the United States’ unipolar moment. The realist scholar John Mearsheimer has even argued that “[i]f China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”
While this view is perhaps a little provocative for some, many believe that China’s rise (which is coming on fast) will witness a reshaping of global power in favour of the East. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, International affairs professor G. John Ikenberry suggests an alternative shape to the unfolding international arena; a structure within which the US can remain dominant. To achieve this however America will have to strengthen the liberal order that exists today.
World War II threw the United States into the global arena. At the end of the war America “did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together.”
This Western order or system was designed with longevity in mind; and central to that durability was the notion of participation and integration. As Ikenberry notes, this system “was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated axis states and the beleaguered Allied States into a unified international system.”
In the twenty-first century this Western order is open to China to utilize and thrive in. Indeed, “China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power”
within the milieu of Western orientated international institutions. However, if America wants to retain its leadership position, it will have to work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that system – “making it even easier to join and harder to overturn.”
Of course, just as inevitable as China’s rise, America’s “unipolar moment” will end eventually. Against this backdrop, the key for American policymakers is to accommodate China’s economic and political growth in a way that wields benefits for both parties. As China’s economic growth continues its status as a developing country will change. Beijing will no longer be a client of Western global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank; it will instead become a shareholder or patron of these institutions. Thus, reforming these institutions to accommodate China’s needs and interests will be paramount to their longevity. If these institutions prove relevant for China, China will see the advantage of retaining its membership. Hence, in the context of accommodation, “the Western order has the potential to turn the coming power shift [toward China] into a peaceful change on terms favorable to the United States.”
Due to the nature of the Western international system, taking the necessary steps to strengthen America’s position within this system will inevitably strength the structure of the system itself. In this light another picture emerges. China may well overtake the economic strength of the United States in the next few decades “but it is much less likely that China will ever manage to overtake the Western order.”
Ikenberry, John G.”The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. Available on the Internet at www.foreignaffairs.org.
Michael D. Huckabee
In keeping with presidential hopefuls from both parties, Michael D. Huckabee, a candidate for the Republican nomination considers current American foreign policy “arrogant” and “counterproductive” to the interests of America. “American foreign policy,” writes Huckabee, “needs to change its tone and attitude, open up, and reach out. In particular, it should focus on eliminating Islamist terrorists, stabilizing Iraq, containing Iran, and toughening its stance with Pakistan.”
The pattern of US foreign policy in recent years is judged defective by most candidates running for President in 2008 and Republican Michael Huckabee is no exception. The former Governor of Arkansas believes President Bush has adopted an “arrogant bunker mentality” in the international arena; a situation that has augured poorly for America and its allies. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Huckabee outlined his strategy for American foreign policy if elected President in November. At the core of his plan is the implementation of several interrelated initiatives that he claims will rebuild America’s credibility with its allies and enemies, while not surrendering any of America’s sovereignty. For example, he is opposed to the ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which he argues “would endanger both our national security and our economic interests.”
According to Huckabee,
“[t]he United States’ strategic interests as the world’s most powerful country coincide with its moral obligations as the richest.”
For that reason, his objective in the Arab and Muslim worlds “will be to calibrate a course between maintaining stability and promoting democracy.”
In keeping with Jean Kirkpatrick’s argument on dictators written back in 1979 - a policy that guided the Reagan administration throughout the 1980s - a Huckabee administration would be willing to work with dictatorships that suit American interests. Moreover, he also intents to increase US defence spending from 3.9 percent of GDP to around six percent – the same level as the Reagan administration in 1986.
In addition to those outlined, Huckabee has several more proposals that will define his administration’s foreign policy. First, he will work to achieve American energy independence from the Middle East. His stated goal is to be able “to treat Saudi Arabia the way we treat Sweden.”
Second, he would let the CIA and U.S. Special Forces eliminate the threat from Islamic terrorists, while increasing personnel levels in the Army to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. And while his administration would work to stabilise Iraq were the hot war is, he will move his intentions to Pakistan where there is a cold war under way. According to Huckabee, Pakistan “is where the cold, calculating [al Qaeda] planning is going on.”
Thus, he would practice tough love in Pakistan. “Rather than wait for the next strike, I prefer to cut to the chase by going after al Qaeda’s safe havens in Pakistan.”
And finally, on Iran Huckabee will engage through aggressive multilateral diplomacy to contain Iranian aims. “We must intensify our diplomatic efforts with China, India, Russia, South Korea, and European states and persuade them to put more economic pressure on Iran.”
Huckabee, Michael, D. “America’s Priorities in the War on Terror Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. Available on the Internet at www.foreignaffairs.org.
Analysing the latest issues & trends in the US, especialy in US Foreign Policy