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UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies

Transatlantic Affairs Newsletter -
Volume Two, Issue 3
November / December 2006

Ireland and the United States

New American Ambassador to Ireland

On the 18th October 2006 the new American Ambassador to Ireland, Thomas C. Foley presented his credentials to the President of Ireland at Áras an Uachtaráin. Ambassador Foley succeeds Ambassador James C. Kenny to become the twenty-ninth U.S. ambassador to Ireland. * Ambassador Foley was previously stationed in Iraq as the director of Private Sector Development for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CAP) and has extensive experience in finance and business.

The new Ambassador arrives in Ireland during a time of hope and potential opportunity for the Northern Peace Process. The recent formulated St. Andrew’s agreement will, if accepted, form for a robust foundation for sustained peace in the years ahead. As an experienced American diplomat and businessman Ambassador Foley can add considerably to the political and economic components of the agreement. The publication of an economic strategy designed to create a comprehensive all-island economy will form a central tenet of conating the peace process in the North, and Ambassador Foley is in a good position to help promote this endeavour.

The appointment of Ambassador Foley to Ireland, in conjunction with the already appointed Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, Dr. Mitchell Reiss, is a clear indication of President Bush’s commitment to enhance Irish –American bonds and promote a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.

*This number was based on information obtained from the US embassy website in Dublin.

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The United States and the European Union

Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe

F. Stephen Larrabee

The emergence of liberal economic practices and the processes of democratic reform in Eastern Europe during the 1990s are now under threat. The prevailing trend in the region is an increase in public support for populist and nationalist parties. These developments threaten to reduce pro-Europe and pro-liberal market parties to negligible forces in the politics of the region. According to F. Stephen Larrabee, the recent resurgence in “nationalist and populist forces in Eastern Europe, coupled with the rise of Russia” presents a real threat to enhanced EU integration, NATO stability and US interests on the continent.

The September 2005 election of the conservative party Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and the subsequent electoral victory of the PiS presidential candidate a few weeks later has conate the conservative forces in Polish politics and is a representative microcosm of the larger shifts in the region. The PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his twin brother President Lech Kaczynski “are suspicious of free-market reforms and favour a strong role for the state in the national economy and in other areas such as education and the media.”

In foreign policy and domestic social issues the Polish government have been at odds with wider trends in the EU. Similar developments have been witnessed across the region. This growing division has important implications for the NATO alliance too. These differences have the potential to spill over into the decision making arm of the NATO alliance and cause great difficulty for the US and the alliance itself.

Over recent years Russia has regained an increasingly prominent role as a regional and international actor. This emergence is predominantly associated with its vast energy resources in an era of declining global sources. According to Larrabee, President Putin, unlike his predecessor, “has embarked on a systematic effort to restore Russian influence in eastern Europe and its periphery.”

This policy is having a direct impact on the region and Moscow has utilized economic leverage to expand its influence. This has been clearly demonstrated in Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine over recent years.

Larrabee argues that these developments require immediate attention by Washington. “This is all the more urgent because the process of EU integration is stalled and Moscow, buoyed by rising oil prices, is in an assertive, self-confident mood.”

Perhaps there are legitimate reasons for Washington’s lack of action. Over recent years White House policymakers have been preoccupied with developments in the Middle East and in recent months that preoccupation has expanded to include developments on the Korean peninsula. Taken together and placed against the backdrop of an election year it is not at all surprising Washington has remained relatively silent. According to Larrabee, there are several important steps Washington could and should take to ease these developments and promote increased reform and stability in the region. The American strategy should be to ease visa restrictions for eastern Europeans, avoid playing on divisions in European Member States foreign policy perspectives, promote closer Polish –German relations and EU-Polish relations, and support Ukraine’s integration into NATO.

Larrabee, L. Stephen, Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006.

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Transatlantic Trends 2006

Each year The German Marshall Fund of the United States conducts an in-depth examination of American and European public attitudes on a wide range of global and regional issues. The annual document called Transatlantic Trends provides governments, non-governmental organizations, think tanks and universities with a year-on-year comprehensive assessment of evolving attitudinal patterns. In 2006, the research was conducted in conjunction with several key German Marshall Fund partners. According to the 2006 research, EU-US relations at the official governmental level can be defined as cooperative. The central focus has been to enhance transatlantic efforts to meet mutual challenges. However, on the whole “the image of the United States in the eyes of the world has not recovered from its steep decline after the war in Iraq.”

A summary of the key finding offers some interesting reading. There is mutual agreement among large majorities in Europe and America that global threats pose an important challenge. Islamic fundamentalism was considered an “extremely important” threat-especially by the United Kingdom, where the increase was twenty-two percent points from last year. On Iran, seventy-nine percent of Americans and eighty-four percent of Europeans agree with the on-going international efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Significantly, only fifteen per cent of Americans and five percent of Europeans consider military action in Iran as the best option.

According to the research, fifty-six percent of Americans and Europeans believe that the values underpinning Islam are not compatible with the values of democracy. “However, majorities also agree that the problem is with particular Islamic groups, not with Islam in general.”

Support for the NATO alliance in Europe has seen a decline of fourteen percent since 2002. It now rests at fifty-five percent. The research identified some interesting attitudes to the perennial question of civil liberties vs. action to combat international terrorism. According to the study, Europeans and American share a broad agreement on where to compromise on civil liberties. Most oppose granting government authority to monitor citizens’ telephone usage but support great authority to monitor communications on the Internet. However, European and American attitudes diverge when asked about whether or not governments should be authorized to monitor banking transactions, with more Americans disagreeing than Europeans.

Transatlantic Trends 2006 Partners: The Survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Fundação Luso-Americana Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation.

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The United States and International Affairs

From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution

Edward P. Djerejian

The recent Israeli-Hezbollah war fought in Lebanon posed a fundamental challenge to the entire Middle East peace process and in particular to American policy in the region. Without ignoring the suffering and devastation caused by the fighting, Edward Djerejian argues the war also brought an opportunity; an opportunity to end the conflict in the region permanently. However, to make this happen Washington must push for, and remained committed to, a lasting peace in the region. “The United States should seize this moment to transform the cease-fire in the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict into a step toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement.”

The thirty-four day war ended without either side fundamentally destroyed. Perhaps militarily Hezbollah suffered worse, but there is little doubt that Israeli military policy in Lebanon has bolstered grassroots support for Hezbollah. The conflict highlighted the futilely of attempting to resolve long-standing historical grievances by further violence. According to Djerejian, “peace can come only from negotiated agreements that bind both sides.”

When the conflict started in July 2006, the message from Washington was mixed. Of course they refused to condone the killings on both sides, but they held off calling for an immediate ceasefire and instead called for a “sustainable” ceasefire. “The Bush administration left the strong impression that it was giving Israeli Prime Minster Ehud Olmert’s government time to inflict serious damage on Hezbollah’s infrastructure and personnel.”

Eventually after much international wrangling, coercing and diplomacy the international community managed to agree a serious of steps and stages to end the conflict and stabilise the region. “Resolution 1701, passed on August 11 of this year, refers to the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the presence of a UN force, and the commitment of the government of Lebanon to extend its authority over its territory.”

The Bush administration must now support the peace and development initiative and reaffirm Washington’s commitment to the June 2002 Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on a two-state solution. President Bush must adopt the role of an effective interlocutor between the warring parties, a role that his predecessors have attempted to adopt. In the current war-tired climate now is the appropriate moment for the U.S. to seize the opportunity to bring all the sides together and construct a lasting peace. “Washington has waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question now is whether it can muster the political will to wage peace as well.”

Djerejian, Edward P. From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2006.

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North Korea: Assessing Blame; Examining Motives!

Ralph A. Cossa

The shock waves from North Korea’s recent nuclear test are still resonating in across America. North Korea’s action has put an abrupt stop to the intelligent foreign policy debate about North Korea and instead has ignited a blame game in Washington. According to Cossa, the partisan debate either blames Bush or Clinton for North Korea’s action. The irony is that most have neglected to blame Kim Jong-il’s, North Korea’s “Dear Leader.” It is evident that Kim Jong-il is convinced that having a nuclear deterrent is crucial for North Korea’s survival and “that the benefits to be gained outweigh current (or anticipated) consequences.”

The author provides a relatively neutral assessment of action by the Clinton and Bush administrations and is correct in the conclusion that both Presidents’ pursued action that deserve recognition. The Agreed Framework adopted during the Clinton era did manage to freeze Pyongyang’s known plutonium. There is evidence however, that Kim Jong-il was pursing a uranium based nuclear option during this period. The Bush administration’s policy of addressing the problem multilaterally through the Six-Party Talks has had merit too. Under the current multilateral process Seoul has had a crucial role in the negotiations. The call by many in Washington to negotiate with Pyongyang directly has been offered by the Bush administrations, although only “in the context of the six-party process.”

If Pyongyang wants a bilateral meeting it must return to the process without precondition. At the time of this writing, this is proving near impossible. According to Ralph Cossa, “it has been Pyongyang that has consistently refused to meet with the U.S., either bilaterally or multilaterally, until Washington ends its ‘hostile attitude’.”

What the North Koreans consider hostile is ambiguous at best. It ranges from financial sanctions (currently imposed) to its demand that the light-water reactor project promised as part of the Agreed Framework be completed. Pyongyang has also demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. forced from the Peninsula. North Korea has pursed its nuclear ambitions with relative impunity. The lack of “serious and sustained consequences” is a central rationale motivating Pyongyang to pursue a nuclear capacity. So, what should Washington do next?

The desired objective should be to pursue “a clearly defined, credible, sustained containment policy aimed at ensuring that whatever nuclear capability exists in North Korea remains in North Korea, while exerting firm pressure on Pyongyang.” It is important that this direct action should be undertaken within the Six-Party process. The U.S. must avoid unilateral action on this issue.

Cossa, Ralph A. North Korea: Assessing Blame; Examining Motives! Pacific Forum CSIS, PacNet Number 52, October 20, 2006.

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The New Middle East

Richard Haass

In the latest edition of Foreign Affairs, current president of the Council of Foreign Relations, Richard Haass contends that the Middle East is now entering a fourth era in the modern history of the region. According to Haass, The New Middle East represents the end to American dominance in the region. “It is one of history’s ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq War, a war of choice, has precipitated its end.”

The first modern era of the Middle East appeared around the late 18th century and was signified by Napoleon’s entry into Egypt in 1798. This invasion showed Europeans that the region was open to relatively easy occupation. This era ended with the onset of World War I and what emerged in the aftermath was the era of colonialism, when France and Britain dominated the region. Wrecked by a Second World War in the 1940s the European dominated era ended. The third era was marked by the rise of Arab nationalism and the USSR and the US began to compete more directly in the region. The third era was, as with all previous eras, defined by the interplay of internal and external forces. According to Haass “the Cold War’s balancing act created a context in which local forces in the Middle East had significant autonomy to pursue their own agendas.”

During this period Arab states resisted US pressure to pursue an anti-Soviet Agenda and also came to realise the American vulnerability to oil shortages and price increases.

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the fourth era. America was now in a position to promote it unilateral interests in the region. “Dominant features of this American era were the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait, the long-term stationing of U.S. ground and air forces on the Arabian Peninsula, and an active diplomatic interest in trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all.”

The most significant factor ending the American dominated era in the Middle East has been the Bush administration’s decision to attack Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent conduct of war operations and occupation. Haass also points to several other issues that have weakened American dominance. These include, inter alia, the failure to reach a peaceful conclusion to the Middle East peace process, globalisation and the on set of new media communication in the region and “the failure of traditional Arab regimes to counter the appeal of radical Islamism.”

The factors outlined above culminate to produce bulwarks to American influence in the region. It is likely the Middle East will remain a troubled part of the world, and Haass believes Washington will have to fall back on diplomacy more than military power in the years ahead. Whether American foreign policy can adjust to the new situation in the region remains to be seen.

Haass, Richard, N. The New Middle East, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2006.

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Transatlantic Affair Editor: Frank Groome

If you have any comments or suggestions to improve this service please contact the editor frank.groom@ucd.ie

The William Jefferson Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College, Dublin, www.ucd.ie/amerstud