• privacy policy
• accessibility
• sitemap

UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies

Transatlantic Affairs Newsletter -
Volume Two, Issue 2
September / October 2006

Ireland and the United States

Building the All-Island Economy One Person at a Time

James C. Kenny

In a recent speech to the Newry Chamber of Commerce and Trade, US Ambassador to Ireland James C. Kenny highlighted the economic benefits of peace in Northern Ireland. Expressing the American historical penchant for linking stable or good political behaviour with economic growth the Ambassador stated “that opportunity exists now thanks to political progress. Economic development, in turn, will support the process of reconciliation.”

The Ambassador addressed this point more explicitly with an example in his own country. “As we have seen far too many times in America, economic hardship and despair often lead to self-destructive behaviour and conflicts within communities.”

The ambassador cited the example of economic developments in the Republic of Ireland as a yardstick for the North. The unprecedented economic growth rates in the south of Ireland “are [in] due in large measure to the various forms that private-public cooperation has taken.”

This framework has facilitated U.S. financial investment of over 73 billion dollars, “which has created over one hundred thousand jobs in roughly 620 U.S. subsidiaries across every economic sector in the South.” The ambassador reiterated his belief that “the success of the Celtic Tiger should be all-island in scope,” and with peace becoming entrenched in the societal fabric of the North it is now a real possibility.

Advancing his conviction that “the role of government is not to create wealth,” but to “create an environment in which the entrepreneur can flourish,” ambassador Kenny highlighted several important steps he considers necessary to achieve all-Ireland economic success. First, government and business North and South must reach agreement on how best to exploit existing bonds. Emphasis must be placed tackling cross-border crime. Second, government and private industry must focus on the youth of the island. Providing the best education and technical skills necessary for the next generation, will be paramount to developing and sustaining a productive work force in an increasingly competitive European Union. Finally, building on the education theme the ambassador argued in favour for the National Foundation for the Teaching of Entrepreneurship (NFTE), which has been running in the Republic for the past year and is due to be launched in the North next year. The NFTE is designed to provide students with the motivation and technical skills required to prosper in business. According to the ambassador, the NFTE could be an excellent medium to facilitate cross border cooperation at a young age.

Ambassador James C. Kenny, “Building the All-Island Economy One Person at a Time” Speech delivered at the Newry Chamber of Commerce & Trade Luncheon, May 24 2006.

back to top

The United States and the European Union

Towards a Better Deal

Susan Sechler

The Doha trade negotiations are currently in limbo. According to Susan Sechler this should not stop the richest countries taking steps that could make a real difference to the poorest populations around the world. Many of the negotiating teams, especially from the wealthier countries, welcomed the collapse of the Word Trade Organization (WTO) talks. In the end, most negotiators argued that there was ‘nothing new on the table’ for which to mourn. In a recent Global Subsidies Initiative publication, Susan Sechler disputes this assessment. Sechler argues “the deal that the G6 (USA, EU, Japan, Brazil, India and Australia) dropped because of disagreements over agriculture contained important reforms that should not be lost.”

A finalized agreement (with some revisions) might have facilitated an end to agricultural export subsidies (the bane of past negotiations) and corrected many other trade-distorting farm subsidies. These significant alterations would have enhanced developing-country exporters and provided a framework to reform industrial and agricultural market access, “an area where the bulk of the gains from trade liberalization lie.”

Investigations completed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) indicated that the proposals at Doha would have promoted global annual growth rates of 54 billion (US) dollars. This deal would have benefited poorer countries marginally. The distribution percentage ratio is good but not great. “High-income countries which account for 80% of world income currently, would get almost 60%; middle-income countries, with almost 20 %, would get about 40 %; and low-income countries (only 1.2 % of world income) would see a mere 1.9 % of gains.”

According to Scehler, with some minor revisions to the current proposals the agreement could significantly boost wealth income for the very poor. The stalled negotiations had agreed 97 % of exports from the least developed countries would be exempt from duties and quotas. If this ratio were increased to 100 % of exports world annual growth would increase from 54 billion (US) dollars to 69 billion (US) dollars, with nearly half of that gain going to low-income countries. The logic behind this proposal is simple. The three percent of products arriving from poor countries into the market of rich countries and which are subject to duties and tariffs are products that poor countries produce well and in abundance- clothing, footwear and agricultural products. Of course, convincing more affluent countries, which have their own lobby groups, to implement this revision is much more difficult.

Another aspect of Doha worth saving is the “Aid for Trade” rationale. The idea underpinning this proposal is for rich countries to assist poor countries take advantage of new market-access openings. Four billion dollars has already been committed from donors for this proposed expansion of trade-related development assistance, and WTO director Pascal Lamy is firmly behind it. In the context of recent debt relief discussions by richer countries, it would be disingenuous from them to back away from this commitment now. Europe and America have the central role to play in any future agreement and the leaders and policymakers must seize the initiative and do the right thing.

Susan Sechler, “Towards a Better Deal” Global Subsidies Initiative, Subsidy Watch, Issue 3, August 2006.

back to top

NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership

Lionel Beehner

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 for a myriad of geo-strategic reasons, most important of which was to protect Europe from the threat of the Soviet Union. For many the alliance was designed “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

The alliance has a long-standing history of expansion, growing from twelve members in 1949 to twenty six member in 2004, including many former Warsaw pact members. Against the background of new threats posed by international terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation many experts are calling for NATO to be expanded further. Some cite the forthcoming NATO summit meeting in Riga in November 2006 as the right opportunity to call for expansion. However, not everyone is so anxious to expand “the only standing military alliance that works.”

There are those that stand opposed to this proposal however, and who raise important issues that should be addressed before moving forward. In this recent article by the Council on Foreign Relations, Lionel Beehner examines some of these interesting and sensitive issues.

According to Adjunct Senior Fellow James N. Goldgeier there are several motivating factors pushing for NATO enlargement. The alliance now faces the challenge of a new international security environment. Hence the mission of the organization must change and adapt too. “The goal is to add countries that would add something to NATO, especially at a time when Europeans are having trouble meeting their own defense commitments.”

Goldgeier advocates amending article 10 of the treaty to facilitate the expansion of the alliance outside of Europe, “membership should be extended to any country that shares NATO members’ commitment to human rights, democracy and open markets.”

But what are the dangers of expanding NATO membership? Many analyst and academics argue in favour of a more gradual process. The underpinning rationale is to enable all current members to achieve the same standards in all areas before opening the door to more possibility incompatible member states. According to some analysts, “if you get more countries in there” the decision making process could become unwieldy. Allowing more members to join before current internal divisions are solved would only complicate internal agreements/disagreements potentially making the alliance ineffectual. If an expansion is to take place Russian interests will need to be catered for too. Russia has always opposed NATO expanding eastward. However, in the context of rising global energy costs Russia’s bargaining powers have increased markedly. The recent statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov for a revision of Russia’s national security strategy if NATO expands to include the Ukraine and Georgia is a worrying development. The specifics of a Russian rethink are relatively opaque but the statement is reason enough for NATO to reconsider its position and strategic aims.

It is unclear whether an invitation for membership will be given to the Ukraine, Georgia or the Balkan states at the forthcoming summit meeting in Riga. Whatever the next steps for NATO enlargement, it is vital that its mandate for the twenty-first century is defined clearly and presently.

Lionel Beehner, “NATO Looks to Expand Mission and Membership.” Council on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2006.

back to top

The United States and International Affairs

Annals of National Security: WATCHING LEBANON Washington’s interests in Israel’s war

Seymour M. Hersh

According to the Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the Bush administration was “closely involved in the planning of Israel’s retaliatory attacks” against Hezbollah. In a recent article published in the New Yorker magazine Hersh, relying on anonymous US diplomatic/pentagon sources, claimed that “Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah, and shared it with Bush administration officials, well before” the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006. Perhaps this was the reasoning behind President Bush’s relatively nonchalant reaction when news of the Israeli campaign broke. At the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg on 16 July Bush stated “It’s a moment for clarification” and that “ it’s now become clear why we don’t have peace in the Middle East.”

For Israel, Hezbollah is considered a profound threat to national security. It is a terrorist organisation with a military arsenal that has grown stronger since Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. According to Shabtai Shavit, a former national security adviser to the Knesset, “Hezbollah is armed to the teeth and trained in the most advanced technology of guerrilla warfare. It was just a matter of time. We had to address it.”

The article mentions several reasons why the US administration supported the Israeli bombing campaign in Lebanon. “Within the State Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen the Lebanese government so that it could assert its authority over the south of the country.”

Furthermore, weakening Hezbollah’s capacity to retaliate against Israel in the event of a US military strike on Iran was central to American support. The U.S. government denied the allegation that it knew of Israel’s plan for war. Although a Pentagon consultant disagreed stating instead that the administration “has been agitating for some time to find reason for a pre-emptive blow against Hezbollah….it was our intent to have Hezbollah diminished, and now we have someone else doing it.”

(At the time of this writing, the United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution ending the war, but only time will tell if the truce will hold).

According to Hersh, Israeli officials visited Washington earlier this summer, before the Hezbollah kidnappings “to get a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the United States would bear.” The anonymous source at the Pentagon added, “Israel began with Cheney. It wanted to be sure that it had his support and the support of his office and the Middle East desk of the National Security Council.”

With Cheney and the NSC on board “persuading Bush was never a problem.” According to a Middle East expert cited in the article, Hezbollah’s sustained ability to defend itself and fire rockets into Israel “is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back.”

Throughout the campaign Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, one of the most powerful and outspoken members of the Bush administration, has been relatively quiet when compared to his aggressive visibility in the run-up to the Iraq war. A few current and former intelligent officials interviewed for the article “believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. According to some sources “there was a feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war.”

Seymour Hersh, “WATCHING LEBANON: Washington’s interests in Israel’s war” The New Yorker, August 21, 2006.

back to content

U.S. Gets as Much as it Gives to the U.N.

Thalif Deen

The United States contributes 22 percent of the UN’s regular annual budget of 1.8 billion dollars (US). Many critics argue that Washington exploits this fact to superciliously demand a dominant voice in management and administration of the world body. This annual financial commitment raises the perennial question of value for money in U.S. Congressional debates. As the largest donor does the United States have enough influence in the world body? According to Mark P. Lagon, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary for international organisation affairs, “U.N. member states, and particularly its largest contributors, want to know if they are getting the most value for the dollars they contribute.”

The current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton has also expressed this cost-benefit concern, but unsurprisingly the Ambassador is more robust in his belief that “the United States doesn’t get value for (its) money.” A recent United Nations assessment offers some interesting reading however. According to the latest analysis published by the UN, America has consistently held the top spot in grabbing United Nations procurement contracts, “averaging over 22.5 percent of all U.N. purchases annually.”

In 2002, America received twenty-four percent of all UN contracts, amounting to 194.3 million (US) dollars. In 2003, this figure was 21.8 percent or 194.5 million (US) dollars out of a total of 891.8 (US) million dollars. In 2004 and 2005, this number had increased to 315.8 (US) million and 331.0 million (US) dollars respectively. It is also important not to forget the financial gains the New York economy receives from hosting the U.N. and its agencies. According to former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, the UN, including a huge diplomatic corps, contributes around 3.2 billion (US) dollars annually to the city’s economy. This figure was an estimate of financial gains during the late 1990s. It is highly probably that this figure has increased over recent years.

When compared with Washington’s annual military budget and general approach towards the UN, this permanent “cost-benefit” assessment conducted by Congress is particularly distasteful. According to Norman Solomon, executive director of the Washington-based Institute for Public Accuracy “What the United States spent to violate the U.N. Charter with the invasion of Iraq could have funded the entire budget of the United Nations for decades.”

Each year the Washington spends more than half a trillion dollars on military expenditures. The executive director of the NGO Global Policy Forum James A Paul said that the American administration has a very narrow interpretation of what value for money means. “To them it evidently means ‘agree with us on all things’. It’s not about a utilitarian calculus, a cost –benefit analysis, a sense of a fair exchange. It is a despotic calculus based on subservience.”

Thalif Deen “U.S. Gets as Much as it Gives to the U.N. Inter Press Service News Agency August 14, 2006.

back to top

American's New Strategic Parnter?

Ashton B. Carter

In 2005, the Bush administration negotiated a diplomatic agreement with India that many analysts declared imprudent. The Washington-New Delhi agreement, or “the India deal,” was considered a central tenet of a growing strategic partnership by the signatories. A core ingredient of the agreement involved America abandoning its long established non-recognition of India as a legitimate nuclear power- a decision many in Washington disagreed with. Opponents charged that Washington’s compromise could weaken the wider non-proliferation regime and could set a dangerous standard for rogue states, including North Korea and Iran. Moreover many have argued that the Bush administration acquired

“no meaningful commitments from New Delhi-no promises that India would limit it growing nuclear arsenal or take new steps to help combat nuclear proliferation and international terrorism.” In the recent Foreign Affairs article “America’s New Strategic Partner?” Professor Ashton B. Carter supports the contention that the agreement is unequal, but argues that Washington’s reasoning behind the concession is more strategic and complex.

The traditional pattern of America’s diplomatic deportment regarding India’s nuclear weapons can be described as cold. Washington considered India’s first nuclear test in 1974 illegitimate and this policy has been sustained by successive administrations for two distinct and geo strategic assessments. The first assessment reasoned that any international acceptance of India’s nuclear capability would only facilitate an arms race in the region. The second was Washington’s penchant for sticking strictly to the principles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). As long as India remained outside the treaty it would have to forego international recognition. Of course, as the regional and international environment evolved America had to alter its stance. In the 1980s Pakistan obtained a nuclear weapons capability. This development effectively ruled out India eliminating its nuclear capability. In 1998, this regional tension reached a critical point when India tested five underground nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration acted to ease the tension and potential fallout that could have involved Chinese involvement. The administration however avoided all recognition of India’s nuclear status. Aiming to secure help against Islamist terrorists in the region after 9/11, the Bush administration has reassessed this traditional stance, and in “2005 finally granted India de facto nuclear recognition.”

Although the agreement commits America to behave as if India had signed the NPT, India is free from any commitment to do so. The decision not to include any specific NPT constrains on India in return for recognition was taken despite Washington receiving advice to the contrary from NPT experts. For India the benefits of this agreement are obvious. Against the backdrop of domestic Indian support for such an agreement, the treaty should strengthen the position of the incumbent party (the National Congress Party). But what is in it for America? According to Carter, critics over state the negative impact of this agreement. While acknowledging the direct setback this agreement poses for the NPT regime, Carter argues that this “damage is manageable.” The potential regional/international geo-strategic benefits acquired by Washington is the real prize. There is little doubt that India can be a significant ally in the on-going American war on terrorism. It can play a featured role in helping America build closer and more fruitful relationships with Pakistan and China. And as recent Indian action in the IAEA Board of Governors suggests, India can be a useful friend in preventing Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. In economic terms America can benefit directly by obtaining lucrative military contracts and possible first preference status in future nuclear technological deals with New Delhi. Although these benefits are positive and worth pursing, real dangers do remain and Washington should not shy away from clearly stating its “expectations of this strategic partnership.”

Ashton B. Carter “America’s New Strategic Partner?” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006.

Transatlantic Affair Editor: Frank Groome

If you have any comments or suggestions to improve this service please contact the editor frank.groom@ucd.ie

The William Jefferson Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College, Dublin, www.ucd.ie/amerstud