• privacy policy
• accessibility
• sitemap

UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies

Transatlantic Affairs Newsletter -
Volume Two, Issue 1
July / August 2006

Ireland and the United States

Ireland and the Fourth of July

Frank Groome

The Irish-American relationship is based on a long-standing history of a shared commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Not surprisingly, as with most bilateral relationships, Ireland and the U.S have experienced some uncomfortable periods. However, for the most part, the last fifteen years has seen a tremendous effort on both sides to reaffirm the historical legacy of a close partnership. According to U.S. Ambassador James Kenny "the bottom line is this- the Irish-American relationship has always been a win-win relationship on which both countries benefited".

It has brought enormous benefit to both countries and we can both be proud of the role our fellow countrymen have played in helping each to progress"* A symbolic demonstration of this close partnership can be witnessed in the fact that Ireland and America celebrate each other's national days.

Although not an official ‘federal’ holiday, Americans from all ethnic, racial and religious groups celebrate March 17 each year with as much vigour and enthusiasm as the Irish at home. Likewise on the Fourth of July, Irish-American events are organized around Ireland to celebrate the occasion. These include music, cultural and art exhibitions designed to celebrate American culture and Irish-American connections. In 2006 in Dublin, an American Week is planned, which will include inter alia a US-themed jamboree with bluegrass music, a barn dance and 4th of July fireworks. The resolve to celebrate each other’s national days in this way is a unique and enviable situation not repeated anywhere else.

The intimate relations shared between the Irish and Americans often transcend any sustained political difficulties in the diplomatic relationship. This close cultural affinity provides a sound foundation for our continued economic relationship. As Ambassador Kenny notes, the “two-way investment between our countries is also way out of proportion to Ireland’s size” an undeniable tribute to this close friendship. And although there will be occasions for disagreement, “the fact that we celebrate St. Patrick’s Day and you celebrate the Fourth of July is living, yearly proof of the deep friendship between Ireland and the United States.” *

* U.S. Ambassador James Kenny, “A Confident Ireland As America’s Partner” address to the American Chamber of Commerce: July 4, 2005

back to top

The United States and the European Union

The U.S., the EU and Iran

Frank Groome

American and European efforts to persuade Iran to abstain from attempts to acquire nuclear technology have maintained a leading position at high-level discussions between the transatlantic partners for over two years. The recent EU-US summit in Vienna under the Austrian presidency of the EU, offered another opportunity for the transatlantic partners to debate the current developments. At the time of this writing, Iran is still considering the incentives package it was offered by Britain, France and Germany (the EU 3) on 1 June 2006. The American decision to revise its original position regarding Iran and support the EU plan has fostered a more encouraging atmosphere for future negotiations. In addition, Washington has offered Tehran direct negotiations–a plan that received widespread support in Europe.

The package Iran has been offered is wide-ranging. In exchange for Iran suspending its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programmes and returning to the negotiating table, the US and EU are willing to assist Iran construct new power plants-light water reactors that are less proliferation prone, provide Iran with security guarantees and allow Iran resume enrichment activities in the future, as long as there is approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council. Furthermore, there are several economic incentives attached to the overall proposal, including membership of the WTO and cooperation on civil aviation.

The incentive plan for Iran was delivered by Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for Foreign Policy and hinted at probable reprimands if Iran refuses to accept the ‘generous’ offer. Of course, Solana was cautious not to make explicit any possible threats, although it is widely believed to include UN sanctions. At the time of this writing, the White House has called on Iran to respond as early as next week (26th –30th June) to the package of incentives. However, the original U.S. goal to have agreement by the G-8 summit in Russia in July is unlikely to materialise. Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confirmed this recently by stating that a reply would be given on 22 August. President George Bush has expressed his disappointment at this timeframe and said he wants a reply in "weeks, not months." The U.S. president affirmed his belief that the 22 August seemed "an awfully long time for a reasonable proposal".

While Europe and America are holding out for a positive decision from Tehran shortly, the preceding diplomatic process spearheaded by the EU is an important indication of a shift in international affairs. According to a Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, “by playing such a central role in the Iran case, the EU has demonstrated that it has a role to play [in security and non-proliferation issues] and success in its diplomatic efforts with Iran hold out the hope that the EU will become a pillar in and of itself in the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.”

Jon B. Wolfsthal and Jennifer Hamilton. “The U.S.-EU Summit and the Challenge of Iran’s Nuclear Program.” June 16, 2006. Available on the Internet at www.csis.org.

back to top

The U.S./EU Summit

Frank Groome

The annual U.S.-EU summit meeting took place in Vienna on June 21 2006. As expected the agenda schedule reflects the dynamic of this indispensable relationship. According to Nile Gardiner of the Heritage Foundation, this year’s summit “takes place amid mounting tension between Washington and Brussels over the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, as well as the growing controversy in Europe over the ‘rendition’ of terror suspects.”

Unsurprisingly therefore, the backdrop to this year’s summit is reminiscent of previous meetings, beset as it is with conflict and cooperation. Several significant and long-standing items appeared on the necessarily extensive agenda. These included inter alia, the continuing war on terrorism, United Nations reform, the Iran nuclear dilemma and promoting cooperation on energy and energy security, climate changes and sustainable development.

The Vienna Declaration issued at the summit adopted the ‘pragmatic’ approach as a means to smooth over the problematic nuances in the partnership. This approach avoided the myriad of negative aspects and emphasized the productive nature this fundamental relationship. On Iran, the leaders of the United States and the European Union applauded the on-going U.S.-European cooperation regarding the Iran nuclear issue. The Declaration was unequivocal with regard to what is expected from Iran at this stage and any future steps deemed necessary by the international community if Iran fails to negotiate. “We have agreed that if Iran decides not to engage in negotiations, further steps would be taken in the Security Council.”

On United Nations reform, the parties agreed to cooperate to ensure the new Human Rights Council becomes an efficient agency “committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Washington and Brussels reaffirmed a mutual commitment to wider UN-reform, although nothing in the declaration referred to the current financial/budget difficulties in the UN. Regarding the recently agreed Darfur Peace Agreement, the leaders indicted their mutual desire to work with the UN and other regional partners to implement the agreement quickly. Again, nothing in the declaration explicitly addressed the current impasse regarding the Sudanese governments refusal to allow UN peacekeepers into the region.

In recent years, the issue of climate change and sustainable development has increasingly becoming a centerpiece for many political parties around Europe. This shift reflects the grassroots nature of the environmental debate. In addition, increasingly high oil prices are forcing many to question the practicality of non-renewable fuel sources. In this context, the statement on “Promoting Strategic Cooperation on Energy and Energy Security Climate Change and Sustainable Development”

was a timely development. The mutual commitments agreed upon at the summit are far-reaching and extensive. They involve maintaining an up to date analysis on geopolitical implications of the worldwide energy situation, the promotion of diversified fuel sources including through the use of biofuels, continued cooperation for the promotion of the hydrogen economy and ensuring environmental security and safety of energy infrastructures. A significant development includes the creation of an EU-U.S. High Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development to enhance bilateral and multilateral initiatives on Climate Change and Clean Energy.

back to top

The New Transatlantic Agenda

Suat Kiniklioglu

In April the German Marshall Fund of the United States organized the inaugural Brussels Forum, a new platform designed to facilitate discussion on issues and topics of mutual concern for Europe and America. According to Suat Kiniklioglu, the agenda for transatlantic relations has shifted away from the traditional cold war debates around collective security, and is now increasingly focused on issues including, inter alia, energy, terrorism, immigration and the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. On the economic front, the development and economic challenge of India and China are central discussion points.

The developing calamity in the Darfur region of Sudan received due attention by the forum. There was an overwhelming consensus that the international community can no longer ignore the dire situation. The argument was succinct and cogent “our conscience cannot remain at peace without stopping the violence there.”

The American Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke emphasized the need to incorporate Turkey within the transatlantic framework. According to Holbrooke, “how the EU treats Turkey has a direct impact on the transatlantic relationship.”

Discussions concerning the on-going Iran dilemma and Russian democracy also feature predominantly among members of the forum. On Iran, there was general agreement that attempts by the Islamic Republic to acquire nuclear facilities constituted a grave threat to both Europe and America. If Iran managed to secure nuclear technical expertise than regional stability is likely to be severely shaken. Regarding Russia, the forum highlighted a shift towards authoritarian rule. The ‘de-democratization of Russia' was signaled a major development in geo-politics. However, there remained a clear divide between Europe and America as regards the necessary policy towards Russia. According to Suat Kiniklioglu, the discussions within the forum indicated a changing dynamic in global affairs. Europeans seemed more willing to promote their own interests rather than just coattail on Washington’s policies. While the serious issue of energy security and the environment featured as significant aspects in debates, the overarching September 11 environment still dominated discussions.

Suat Kiniklioglu “The New Transatlantic Agenda” Turkish Daily News, May 3, 2006.

back to top

The United States and International Affairs

The End of the Bush Revolution

Philip H. Gordon

On assuming the presidency of the United States in 2001, George Bush and his administration have been marked by controversy and subject to countless assessments by political pundits and academic scholars. The particulars of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) set the foundation for what later became known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine altered America’s foreign policy orientation from relative multilateralism toward a strategy of unilateral preventive war founded on a recognised and asserted U.S. global preponderance of power and couched in the rhetorical messianic language of a necessary and timeless war against terrorism. The argument that September 11 2001 marked the beginning of a new global threat that would require a radically new foreign policy strategy has bolstered the administrations action. In this interesting article by Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution, the language of the Bush administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy is contrasted with action. According to Gordon, “the Bush administration’s “revolutionary” foreign policy rhetoric has not changed, but its actual polices have.”

Exploring the language of 2006 National Security Strategy uncovers the relative consistency in policy of the Bush administration. Statements stressing the fact that “America is at war,” and highlighting the president’s commitment to “fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country,”

are clearly analogous with the rhetoric and missionary zeal of the 2002 NSS. In fact, comparing and contrasting the two documents reveals a consistency in foreign policy thought based on the Bush Doctrine. “But if the rhetoric of the Bush revolution lives on, the revolution itself is over.”

An examination of the foreign policy trajectory of the administration supports this suggestion. Gordon argues that during the first tenure of the current Bush presidency (2001-2005) America overstretched itself in Iraq, alienated vital allies, and allowed terrorism to “overshadow all other national priorities.”

These mistakes are now beginning to provoke a modification of policy among the administration. The Bush presidency is now faced with a “return to realism.”

An indication of this shift appeared early in 2005 (the beginning of Bush’s second term). In her confirmation address, the new U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that “the time for diplomacy in now.”

The Secretary’s and then President’s visit to Europe in early 2005 reaffirmed this commitment to mend relations. On Iran the administration has altered its assessment significantly. As Gordon writes, “After criticizing European engagement with Iran for years and insisting that the United States would not ‘reward bad behaviour,’ the President returned from his February 2005 trip and announced that the United States would support the ‘EU-3’ negotiations…and even throw some of its own “carrots”-airplane spare parts and support for World Trade Organisation accession negotiations-into the mix.”

Another turnabout in “established” policy was visible in North Korea. Having criticized the Clinton administration’ s 1994 Agreed Framework, the Bush presidency accepted an arrangement in September 2005 “that would have provided North Korea with energy aid, security guarantees, and the gradual isation of relations in exchange for North Korea’s abandoning it nuclear weapons programs.”

Although this was never fully achieved the fact that the administration was keen to push such and arrangement is telling. Other important areas that have witnessed a significant shift include the administrations original negative stance on foreign aid and climate change and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Gordon, Philip. The End of the Bush Revolution, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006. Available on the Internet at

back to content

Bolton V Gore: A question of priorities: hunger and disease or climate change?

The Economist

As the debate surrounding United Nations reform continues, U.S. Ambassador John Bolton aroused more disagreement this week. Arguing in favour of the “Copenhagen Consensus” –a list of priorities, drawn up by economists in 2004 that placed efforts to fight malnutrition and disease ahead of fighting climate change-the Ambassador brought together UN diplomats from around the word, excluding Europe, to establish a hierarchy of ten global crises. The “Copenhagen Consensus” compiled by a Danish environmentalist Bjorn Lomborg maintains that “efforts to fight malnutrition and disease would save many lives at modest expense, whereas fighting global warming would cost a colossal amount and yield distant and uncertain rewards.”

On the list produced by the UN diplomats from seven countries “basic health care, better water and sanitation, more schools and better nutrition for children”

featured in the top four, while efforts to avert climate change featured last. According to the Economist, “the ambassadors thought it wiser to spend money on thing they knew would work.”

The U.S. representative to the UN John Bolton welcomed the focus. Bolton said, “Too often at the UN everything is a priority…and when you have 9, 000 priorities you have none.”

This recent endorsement of the principles underpinning the “Copenhagen Consensus,” is likely to disappoint environmental activists such as Al Gore, who has identified global warming as an “onrushing catastrophe.”

According to Mr Lomborg, “We need to realise that there are many inconvenient truths,”

but he remained muted on whether he was optimistic about ambassador Bolton’s chances of persuading the larger UN body to agree on the priorities set. Of course, there remain several underlying difficulties with arguing in favour of the “Copenhagen Consensus.” First, they were produced principally by a group of economists. Hence the emphasis on short-term policy cost effectiveness can be expected. In this exploration the argued “invisible” effects of long-term climate change are subsequently subsumed by perceived “visible” short-term gains. Second, the endorsement by UN ambassadors from seven predominantly developing countries is interesting. China and India for example are both facing the challenge of competing economically in the international market place. Perhaps therefore a governmental policy promoting access to markets and absent of constrains, including reducing carbon emission etc. is expected. Finally, against this background, the “Copenhagen Consensus” would be best utilised as a strategic plan of action to alleviate all the items it discusses and a separate simultaneous plan of action be drawn up to tackle climate change. After all, without a liveable environment all the money in the world won’t mean anything.

Bolton V Gore. A question of priorities: hunger and disease or climate change? The Economist, June 24-30 2006

back to top

America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas

The 15 -Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey

The war in Iraq and the preceding diplomatic debacle in 2002/2003 tarnished America’s global image, especially in Europe. Recent efforts by the Bush administration to promote a positive image of American foreign policy had augured well for Washington. According the Pew Research Centre in 2005, “anti-Americanism had shown some signs of abating, in part because of the positive feelings generated by U.S. aid for tsunami victims in Indonesia and elsewhere.”

However, the most recent survey indicates that these favorable gains have fallen again this year. The latest figures show a significant drop in European attitudes toward America. In Spain, public support for America has dropped a sizeable 18 per cent from 2005, down to 23 per cent this year. A similar trend is visible in Germany and France too, where public opinion of America has once again fallen sharply.

Although this pattern of decline across Europe is a disappointing trend, the recent survey information has identified some positive aspects. The survey indicates that the public of major U.S. allies including Germany, France and Russia share American concerns regarding Iran obtaining nuclear weapons and the effect of the recent victory of the Hamas Party in the Palestinian elections. According to the statistics, 93 per cent of Americans are opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. This corresponds favorably with Germany at 97 percent opposed, France 92 percent, and Russia 82 percent opposed. Likewise, 50 percent of American believe that the recent Hamas Party victory in Palestine in bad for the Palestinian people. Once again this is consistent with European public attitudes in Spain, France and Germany at 47, 69 and 71 per cent respectively.

An exploration of international public opinion regarding confidence in President Bush provide the administration with some disappointing reading. Overall confidence in the president to do the right thing in world affairs has declined in seven out of eleven countries compared to 2005. In Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain the confidence of president Bush in the international arena has declined by 8, 10, 5 and 11 percent respectively. In the Middle East, trans-Caucuses and Asia this negative trend is even more startling. The survey stresses that Turkey now registers the lowest level of confidence in President Bush at 3 percent. In Pakistan, Jordan and Egypt, the statistics are 10, 7 and 8 percent respectively. Against the background of sustained American public diplomacy in the Greater Middle East region these results are very unsettling indeed. In Japan and China results also indicate a low level of support for the president-at 32 and 34 percent respectively.

As the Bush administration aspires to enhance its tarnished image abroad, it also endeavors to persuade individual countries in Europe and elsewhere to stand firm against global terrorism. The most recent statistics in this area will once again prove disappointing for the policymakers in Washington. The steepest decline in support for the war on terrorism is visible in Spain where support has fallen to 19 percent from a high of 63 percent in 2003. In Japan too, support has fallen significantly from 61 percent in 2002 to 26 percent today. In fact, this negative trend is relatively consistent throughout the countries surveyed and indicates the failure of American policy to persuade people to stay the course against the terrorists.

America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas The 15 -Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey.

back to top

Transatlantic Affair Editor: Frank Groome

If you have any comments or suggestions to improve this service please contact the editor frank.groom@ucd.ie.

The William Jefferson Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College, Dublin, www.ucd.ie/amerstud