UCD, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland | Director: Professor Liam Kennedy
UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies
William Jefferson Clinton Auditorium
University College, Dublin
Tel: +353 1 7161560
Transatlantic Affairs is a bimonthly newsletter designed to provide a succinct synthesis of contemporary 'must read' articles emanating from a variety of sources dealing with current transatlantic socio-political and economic events. The newsletter is divided into three sections, Ireland and the United States, the United States and the European Union and the United States in an international context.
Frank Groome
An historical assessment of the Irish-American relationship reveals some interesting insights. The relationship has never been as smooth in practice as the rhetoric suggests. Until around the 1970s the relationship was a somewhat uncomfortable alliance. In fact, it is only in the last generation that Ireland and the United States have developed the positive, productive and dynamic interaction that defines the relationship for many today. Notwithstanding the shift in U.S. policy toward Ireland over the past thirty years or so, the relationship today has its own difficulties. Most of these troubles surround the U.S. war in Iraq and the U.S. war against international terrorism.
According to a recent Amnesty International report 76 per cent of the Irish public want “to play no role in the grotesque practice of renditions,”
and want the Irish Government to investigate each apparent CIA flight through Shannon airport.1 At the same time the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland, James C. Kenny, is convinced that “no credible evidence exists to link Ireland with any of the so-called rendition flights. None.”
2 Coupled with the allegations of rendition flights through Shannon airport is the issue of the US military personnel using Shannon as a stopover on the way to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the last number of years this issue has provoked heated exchanges among the Irish anti-war movement and the Irish government, but it has also soured the Irish public perception of American international action. For Ambassador Kenny, the issue is a commercial and not a political arrangement, an arrangement that has been in place for decades. The commercial agreement is supposedly worth more than 37 million euros a year in fees and services to Shannon airport. Furthermore, the Ambassador was quite clear to the Irish Parliamentary Society in March 2006, that if the use of Shannon was denied to America, there “are dozens of other airports across Europe that will jump at the business…. closing it to U.S. forces will not end the war in Iraq, but it will end the jobs of hundreds of people who rely on that trade to provide for their families.”
3 According to the Irish anti-war movement the Irish government has been firmly implicated in renditions and has been involving a supposed neutral Ireland in the imperialist adventures of the US military. Shannon airport has become a key refuelling facility for US warplanes en route between the US and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Of course, it is important to maintain an objective stance on these controversial issues in order to work towards conciliation and a mutually beneficial outcome. The anti-war movement certainly raises some interesting and vital issues regarding possible breaches in international law and international human rights standards. On the other hand - and not to dismiss the ambiguity regarding the reasons for war in Iraq in the first instance - United Nations Security Council resolution 1546 calls on member states to support the multinational forces in Iraq, which could include facilities at Shannon. Moreover, the historical precedent set by the Irish government regarding the use of Shannon by US. Military personnel would be a difficult road to backtrack from, especially given our over reliance on U.S. foreign direct investment for economic growth and stability. Set against historical evidence, perhaps the question becomes why should we now deny access to U.S. forces in Shannon?1 Sean Love “Rendition is just another word for torture” Irish Time article 5th April 2006.
2 U.S. Ambassador James C. Kenny “Irish lives may have been saved by war on terror” Irish Time article 14th April 2006.
3 U.S. Ambassador James C. Kenny “Terrorism, Guantanamo, and Shannon Airport” Delivered to the Irish Parliamentary Society, March 30, 2006.
John Edwards
In a recent keynote address to the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, former Senator John Edwards called on the United States and Europe to take the lead to fighting mutual challenges in the international arena. These mutual challenges include inter alia climate change, prevention of infectious diseases and global poverty. Recognizing that divisions exist within the transatlantic community, Edwards believes that “debate among friends is natural, sometimes important and sometimes necessary, especially when the issues are so important,”
but affirmed his belief that too much energy and time had been wasted on looking backwards at the by now well documented differences.
For Edwards, the key questions for the transatlantic alliance include: “how can we be working together to make the world more secure? How can we strengthen our existing institutions or create new ones to meet these new challenges? How should we be responding to the changes under waiting key countries like China, India, Russia?"
In this interesting address Edwards focused on three strategic challenges faced by the transatlantic community. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the reform of NATO, and how should the transatlantic community adapt to a transforming Russia.
On WMD Edwards reaffirmed his belief that Europe and America should take the lead and place a global ban on the production of material for nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is vital that the necessary know-how to build nuclear weapons never reaches the hands of terrorists. On the Iran crisis Edwards was reasonably forthcoming in his criticism of the current American strategy, but was clear in his belief that Iran was intent to develop nuclear weapons. He lauded the diplomatic efforts of the EU3 for its work and its leadership in this area. Nonetheless, Edwards was convinced that “the international community must confront Iran with a clear choice, give up your nuclear ambitions or suffer the consequences.”
Edwards qualified this point by stating it was not just a simple choice between diplomacy and war. He is convinced that the full diplomatic toolbox should be utilized first. Regarding the necessary reform of NATO, Edwards argued that the organization must be used to end some of the world’s most dire emergencies. The organization must develop a capacity to act efficiently outside of Europe, and of course in this context NATO action in Afghanistan is a welcome development. But more can be done. According to Edwards, ‘NATO should step in today to end the genocide in Sudan. It’s good that NATO has helped the African Union troops with logistic support and training, but this has not stopped the killing.”
Edwards also argued for a more robust EU-US relationship and dismissed arguments that a closer EU-US partnership would undercut NATO.
On Russia, Edwards, put forward a litany of emerging difficulties most of which have centered on the Russian economy and society. Edwards argued that “Russia is a profoundly different place than it was as the Soviet Union. It's not going back there and we’re not going back to the Cold War, but during the past few years we’ve seen negative trends to overtake many of these positive developments. There has been an erosion of democratic freedoms, increasing centralization of power, corruption and organized crime penetrating the government.”
According to Edwards Russia has a choice to join the international community and work productively to fight mutual challenges, or be a “spoiler.” Europe and America need to send the same message to Russia in our relations with that country, and of course a strategic partnership with Russia should still be our chosen path. But the EU-US relationship must be resolute in our determination that Russia democratize and reform.
John Edwards, “The Transatlantic Partnership in an Age of Global Challenges” key note address at the Brussels Forum. The German Marshall Fund.
John B. Bellinger, III
There is little doubt that the transatlantic partnership is fundamental to the peace, security and economic prosperity of both Europe and America for over sixty years. For many the recent division in policy over Iraq has provided the framework through which transatlantic is to be assessed. According to this assessment, American and European worldviews are now bifurcated, or as Robert Kagan uncomplicatedly framed it, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”
An exalted example of these differences is manifesting the area of international law. Washington’s reluctance to be constrained by international treaties such as the Kyoto protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the monitoring mechanisms of the Biological Weapons Convention only added to the belief that the long-era in transatlantic cooperation is over. In this interesting article, John B. Bellinger III, legal advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State asks whether there is actually a deep divide between the United States and Europe on questions of international law? And, if so, how significant is this divide?
According to Bellinger, embedded within the criticism of U.S. policy are several reoccurring “categories of mistakes,” which should be discussed. First, America is often heavily criticized for failing to sign or ratify a treaty. The Kyoto Protocol is a useful example. For Bellinger, America did not ratify the treaty because the U.S. did not think it was sound public policy. This decision was perfectly legal under international law. Second, the article maintains that there exists a tendency to conflate “the failure to subscribe to international agreements, and the decision to withdraw from international agreements-with a disregard for international law.”
A third type of criticism- “disagreements with U.S. interpretations of international instruments” -is important, as it again leads critics to regard the U.S. a contravening international law, when in actuality America is only interpreting a treaty differently. This is quite practice in international law and there is no secret that treaty language is often drafted so as to permit more than one interpretation.
Of course, Bellinger does not deny that there are transatlantic differences in approach to international law. His contention is that when examined these differences have very little to do with a disregard for international law and instutions. Given the increasing strain on both multilateralism and international law, as reflected in recent controversies regarding the law of war and occupation- in particular the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions- it is perhaps more important then ever to dispel any myths in the transatlantic partnership and instead begin a process of understanding designed to achieve a more productive legalistic future.
John B. Bellinger III “Transatlantic Approaches to International Law” The Atlantic Council of the United States.
By some estimates, over two hundred thousand people have been killed and two million driven from their homes since 2003 in the western Sudan province of Darful. Is the world's attendtion now focused on the conflict enough to broker an end to the killing and bring pease and stability to this war-torn country? Certainly the rhetoric from international community is positive and media attendion has once again found a "story" in Sudan. However, many wonder whether this recent effort to end the suffering will just fail as the Comprehensive Peace Accord failed in January 2005. Is there enough politifcal will to force the Sudanese government to stop the reassertion of the Janjaweed militia and end the hardship in Darfur once and for all?
At a meeting of political and intellectual leaders organized by the German Marshall Fund in April 2006 the participants emphasized a firm desire to see EU-US cooperation enhanced in Sudan. According to Javier Solana, “Darfur is a case in which we are working together much more intensely today than a month ago, a few months ago or years ago.”
Senator John McCain (Rep) reiterated the need for EU-US action, but was firm in his conviction that “we need more troops. We need better logistic support. We need more pressure put on the Sudanese government.”
McCain ignored the usual diplomatic tiptoeing and stated that “today, thousands of people will die; others will be slaughtered. That millions are displaced and the world is standing by because we don’t have the “political framework.”
Former US Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke was shocked by the fact that in the middle of all this killing and political stagnation, the World Food Program had recently announced “that they’re having daily calorie content cut from 2, 100 calories a day to 1, 050 because less than one-third of the 700 million dollars it asked for from donors had come through.”
On 1 May 2006, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick was dispatched to Sudan to push for a peace agreement. This trip was announced in the context of a two-day extended deadline for a settlement that ended without agreement. According to Secretary of State Rice, the President feels “very strongly and passionately’ about the need for agreement and for establishing a large African security force to protect the people of Darfur. As the crisis in Darfur continues to get worse only time will tell whether Europe and America are committed to achieving permanent peace in Sudan.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Richard C. Holbrooke, John McCain, Dr. Javier Solana “Framing a Transatlantic Agenda for a Global Era” The German Marshall Fund, April 2006.
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom
For over three years now American military forces have occupied Iraq. US efforts to eliminate Iraqi insurgents and build a peaceful and prosperous Iraq has had limited success. In the face of this limited achievement President Bush is as resolute as ever to stay the course in Iraq, leading many to question the practicality and judgment of the administration’s policy. In this succinct and lucid article former director of the National Security Agency (1985-1988) Lt. Gen. William E. Odom (Ret.) explores the current viability of US policy in Iraq. The former Lt. General argues that the “prewar dream of a liberal Iraqi democracy friendly to the United States is no longer credible”
and in this context America should get out now. Of course, to pull out now raises a number of questions about US policy and Iraq’s future. Several of these concerns are addressed throughout the article.
Given the ethnic and religious division in Iraq many in Washington are worried about the affect of a possible American withdrawal on an already unstable country. For Odom, “a civil war in Iraq began just weeks after the U.S. forces toppled Saddam.”
The record shows that the insurgents have in fact killed more Iraqis than American soldiers or civilians. Against this backdrop, a civil war in Iraq is already in full swing. The quicker the administration recognizes this better. A second important argument put forward against an immediate withdrawal is that without American military forces the terrorists will be emened and gain a firmer hold on Iraq. According to Lt. General Odom, America will have to bite the bullet on this issue. “Our continued occupation of Iraq also encourages the killers-precisely because our invasion made Iraq safe for them.”
Events on the ground in Iraq indicate that former Baathists are joining the ranks of al Qaeda rather then surrendering. Staying the course in Iraq is unlikely to alter this fact. Withdrawing however, might “result in Sunni groups' turning against al Qaeda and its sympathizers, driving them out of Iraq entirely.”
The increasing demand for the United States to withdraw from Iraq has many pundits arguing the credibility card. According to this argument, if America withdraws now U.S. credibility in the world would be undermined. A glance back at the protracted American conflict in Vietnam reveals startling comparisons. This argument was proved wrong then and does not stand up to scrutiny today. In fact, Odom argues that a “rapid reversal of our present course in Iraq would improve U.S. credibility around the world.”
The “European politicians would be more likely to cooperate with us in a strategy for stabilizing the greater Middle East”
if we stop moving deeper into Iraq. Moreover, a quick reversal of policy in Iraq is likely to improve Washington’s diplomatic and military mobility. Given the current developments in Iran, Sudan and the often forgotten situation in North Korea this diplomatic and military maneuverability could prove very prudent.
Lt. Gen. William E. Odom ‘Cut and Run? You Bet.’ May/June 2006 Foreign Policy.
Lionel Beehner
The United States is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the necessary productive atmosphere in its relations with central Asian states. In 2002, the United States obtained access to several central Asian military bases to aid in its fight against the Taliban and the larger war on terror. Today however, strained U.S. relations with a number of central Asian countries have threatened the sustainability of remaining at these necessary strategic locations. In Uzbekistan, the U.S. was told to leave the Karshikhanabad military base last year, after the U.S. government criticized the Uzbek government’s crackdown on the freedom of its own people. In April this year, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev –who gained power after the so-called “Tulip revolution” last year –threatened to remove U.S. forces if America fails to pay two hundred million dollars in rent for the Manas military base by the 1st June 2006.
Adding to the already difficult situation is the developing relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Economic and military relations between the two countries have increased substantially over recent years, and Russia is currently planning to expand its military presence in Kyrgyzstan. According to Beehner, “some experts say the Kremlin was behind Bakiyev’s demand for higher rent payments from Washington.”
Meanwhile, China has also been seeking greater influence in the region. This Chinese policy has been driven primarily by its demands for alternative energy routes, but also by the desire for increased stability to its western borders.
Recent evidence suggests that Russia and China have also acted through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to squeeze American forces out of central Asia. In an effort to counter this development Washington is reportedly in discussions with other states in the region, including, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
Lionel Beehner ‘Shrinking U.S. Clout in Central Asia’ Council on Foreign Relations (Daily Analysis) April 28, 2006.
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Ivo H. Daalder
On 11th April 2006 Iran announced it had enriched uranium. Iran qualified the statement by saying that the enrichment is to 3.5 per cent, which is sufficient for nuclear power fuel but not high enough for a nuclear bomb. So, why is the international community so worried? At the most fundamental level the West believes that Iran cannot be trusted and secretly wants to develop a nuclear bomb. Adding increasing tension is a recent statement by Iran that it had received a black-market document on the construction of a nuclear device from the Pakistani scientist AQ Khan. Although the United States has repeatedly called for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the impasse serious difficulties remain. On 28 April 2006, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report found that Iran had not complied with a UN demand to end uranium enrichment. A recent statement by U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicolas Burns reiterated the desire for a peaceful resolution, but indicated that America expects the UN Security Council to prepare a firm and binding resolution that could allow for sanctions against Iran.
According to Ivo Daalder, “there appears to be an emerging consensus in Washington and around the world, that war with Iran is just a matter of time.”
Many have argued that the Iranian nuclear threat is more real than the Iraqi nuclear threat in 2003. Hence the theory that if Bush went into Iraq on such relatively weak evidence surely he won’t hesitate in Iran. Contrary to this, Ivo Daalder presents a case for presuming that the Bush administration will “conclude that military force does not offer a desirable answer”
to the current impasse. The reasons underlying this line of thought is the current political, military and international context.
In 2002, America “was still under the spell” of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The arguments for the need to prevent new global threats emerging coupled with the perceived U.S. military success in Afghanistan in October 2001 rang louder and were more convincing four years ago then today. Moreover, in 2002 and 2003 the President was riding high in domestic opinion polls, providing sufficient political capital to take the country into war. In 2006 the domestic situation is completely different. In one recent poll “54 per cent of Americans said they did not trust Bush to make the right decision on Iran.”
Given the developing quagmire in Iraq these numbers are likely to continue to drop.
Despite American difficulties in obtaining international support for the Iraq invasion and the subsequent diplomatic tensions that developed across the Atlantic, Washington still secured a unanimous UN Security Council resolution 1441 on Iraq. Moreover, during the war America had the support, however minimal, of some key allies, including the UK and Australia. On Iran, the UK has already made it clear they are not prepared to go to war in Iran. A combination of all the strategic difficulties outlined, in conjunction with the “human, economic, political and diplomatic consequences of the Iraq war so very evident to all”
means “there is nothing inevitable about war with Iran.”
Ivo Daalder “Is War with Iran Inevitable?” The Brookings Institution, April 2006.
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The William Jefferson Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College, Dublin, www.ucd.ie/amerstud
© CIAS 2006