• privacy policy
• accessibility
• sitemap

UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies

Transatlantic Affairs Newsletter
Volume One, Issue 2
September / October 2005

Ireland and the United States

‘A Mutual Partnership’

During the 1990s Ireland’s economic growth was exceptional. The country was transformed from a European laggard to a relative economic bastion. Gross domestic product (GDP) more than tripled between 1990 and 2003, from €36 billion to €138 billion and per capita gross domestic product is now among the top four economies in the world. Between 1994 and 2003, average annual real economic growth in Ireland was 8 per cent.

Ireland’s remarkable economic expansion is often set within the context of EU membership. And while there is little doubt the EU has played a vital contribution to Ireland’s overall economic success, America too, should be recognised for its important role. Over the past 20 years Ireland’s long-standing close cultural, diplomatic and political connections with the US has augured well for the Irish economy.

Today, there are approximately 1,050 foreign owned companies in Ireland’s industrial and manufacturing sectors, half of which are from the United States. At present around half of all foreign direct investment (FDI) coming into Ireland is American and Ireland now accounts for roughly one-quarter of all American FDI in Europe.

According to Ireland’s Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment Micheál Martin T.D., US companies feel comfortable with Ireland “we’re a good gate to the EU market place” and “most people say that Ireland is the most American place to do business in the world outside America.”

This assessment is reinforced by comments made by Dr. William Harris of the Science Foundation Ireland* who wrote in a recent article that “watching Ireland imitate what is best in the US system might be a helpful reminder to US policymakers to preserve and strengthen their own government.”

This close economic partnership is reciprocal. In the past two years, the US has become Ireland’s largest single export market with a 20 per cent share in 2004, amounting to the equivalent of US$20 billion. In the aftermath of the recent economic slowdown in America small and medium sized Irish firms have begun re-investing in the US. Over the past year the number of indigenous Irish firms with offices in the US has grown from thirty to more than two hundred and today, Irish companies have invested more than $25 billion in the US and employ almost seventy thousand people.

Of course, despite all this positive interconnectivity, there remains room for improvement. Ireland and the United States should continue to work to add further momentum to an already robust and mutual economic partnership through enhancing our cultural, political and diplomatic bonds.

*William Harris is director and a founding member of The Science Foundation Ireland (SFI). The SFI was founded in 2000 as part of the Irish Governments National Development Plan 2000-2006.

back to contents

The United States and the European Union

‘America, Europe and the Challenge of Bringing Democracy to Iran’

Philip H. Gordon

According to Philip Gordon at The Brookings Institution, Iran now presents a greater challenge to the transatlantic partnership than any other State in the world. This view has been bolstered recently by Iran’s decision to restart its nuclear programme at Isfahan. European offers of political and economic incentives, designed to deter the theocratic State from building nuclear bombs, have not proved enticing enough.

The possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability could directly threaten European and American security, provide the necessary confidence for Iran to continue to support Hizbollah and Hamas, and fatally damage the wider non-proliferation regime. Moreover, if Iran does manage to become a nuclear power, it is likely to cause other regional States, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, to re-examine their own non-nuclear status. Gordon argues that “Iran’s ability to cause trouble for the West-and within the West-underscores why Europe and the United States have a stake in the democratic evolution of the Iranian political system.”

A democratic Iran would offer a better prospect for resolving some of the historical grievances and differences between Iran and the West, while also providing its citizens with a much improved way of life. A liberal democratic Iran would not pose a direct or indirect threat to the West and would doubtless find a friend in Europe and America. The question is how to assist Iran in such a direction.

There are some inherent difficulties with this proposed strategy. First, although most signals indicate that the Iranian people want change, it is not clear how to support internal efforts to achieve this. Second, democratising Iran is additionally complicated by its potential nuclear programme. The West will have to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear aspirations. This will not be an easy task. Finally, the EU and the US do not fully agree on the best way to achieve the desired result. While the US is focusing on the Iranian nuclear programme and working hard not to reward Iran for bad behaviour, the Europeans are unconvinced about America’s ability to bring about regime change and are more willing to offer Iran a diplomatic solution to the current impasse.

Against this background, Philip Gordon postulates that the West needs to formulate a common “strategy that seeks both to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program without foregoing efforts to bring political change to Iran.”

Gordon, Philip H. America, Europe and the Challenge of Bringing Democracy to Iran, The Brookings Institution, July 2005.

Key events related to Iran's nuclear programme: taken from The Wall Street Journal Europe, 18 August 2005

• Aug 2002: Exile opposition groups claim Iran has been working on secret uranium enrichment programme; IAEA later confirms these reports.
  
• July 2003: France, Germany and the UK agreeto launch talks to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions.
  
• May 2005: Iran agrees to hold off on plans to restart uranium processing for two months.
  
• Aug 5: Iran rejects EU proposal that it give up nuclear fuel in return for economic, political concessions.
  
• Aug 9: Iran resumes uranium processing, but leaves door open for negotiations on enrichment.
  
• Aug 11: President Bush signals support for negotiations but says "all options on the table."
  
• September 3: Deadline for IAEA to issue report on Iran's nuclear programs.

back to top

‘Casting the EU as a counterweight to the US would only divide Europe’

Charles Kupchan

After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch electorates, Europe entered into a proclaimed period of reflection. This quiet period is designed to allow the dust settle after the Treaty setback and the subsequent failure to reach agreement over the EU budget. According to Charles Kupchan “the enterprise of European integration has slipped into one of the most serious crises in its history.”

The difficult challenges facing Europe’s political leadership is to offer a strategic road ahead. This can be achieved most successfully by re-learning the lessons of the past. Kupchan emphasizes five key lessons that Europe must recognize before moving forward.

First, the 1 May 2004 enlargement of the EU, while crucial to conating central Europe’s democratic transition, has come at the expense of a deeper Union. “Deepening should have taken place in advance of widening”

allowing the EU to function more efficiently with ten new members. Second, in the recent referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and The Netherlands, Europe’s economic woes were cited as central reasons to vote ‘Non’. In this way Europe became a scapegoat for the shortcomings of national governments. Clearly Europe must economically reform for integration to be successful; however, it is member States such as France and Germany, the traditional economic locus of Europe, that need to reform and remove national impediments to economic development for overall growth to be obtained.

Third, faced with eastward expansion and the commencement of accession talks with Turkey that could lead to Union membership in the future, the EU must work to encourage ethnic tolerance and the integration of Muslims into the mainstream. The fourth lesson Kupchan cites is the “democratic deficit,” a problem that many in Europe feel needs to be addressed before Europe integrates further. Finally, the desire among some European leaders to cast the EU as a counterbalance to the US in the world is likely to fail because “most Europeans do not want to choose between the EU and the United States.”

While many in Europe have an aversion to President Bush and his polices, they would prefer to maintain the close Atlantic alliance between Europe and America. Kupchan argues that EU leaders that seek a greater geopolitical role for the EU are only likely to succeed in dividing Europe itself.

Kupchan, Charles. Casting the EU as a counterweight to the US would only divide Europe, Irish Times Article, 10 August 2005.

back to contents

‘The Shared Farm Policy Agenda in Brussels and Washington’

Susan Sechler and Jack Thurston

Transatlantic dialogue on farming and food policy is often complicated, acrimonious and without results. Both sides point the finger and accuse “the other of being the worst offender in terms of subsidies, tariffs or discriminatory use of food safety regulations.”

According to Susan Sechler and Jack Thurston, transatlantic comparisons are problematic because farm structures and farm policies are so different. However, in the face of new domestic and international pressures, the time is now right to begin a positive transatlantic debate on the future path of agriculture policy.

Regarding export markets, Europe is progressing in the direction of high margin speciality products, while the US is still competing as a low-cost producer of bulk commodities. The structures of farm support policies - which are having harmful effects on the economies of developing countries - are also very different on both sides of the Atlantic. On the whole, the EU has higher tariffs on agricultural products than America, but Europe does import a substantial amount under preferential trade agreements with former colonies - 85 per cent of agricultural exports from the African continent are to Europe.

Despite these differences, the EU and the US do share the challenge of trying to reconcile the narrow interests of individual domestic commodity producers and the interests of the wider economy in an increasingly competitive world. Sechler and Thurston contend that domestic budgetary/subsidy problems within the EU and the US, combined with new issues of conservation and rural development as underscored by various NGO groups, are today being compounded by the larger challenge of trade liberalisation within the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the pressure in the EU and US to reach agreement on the Doha Development Agenda is growing from a variety of business sectors including, non-agricultural businesses and other food producers who see future growth potential in developing markets.

Obviously the “hard politics of large entitlement programmes mean that agriculture will remain the most heavily subsidised economic sectors in both the US and the EU for some time to come.” However, faced with similar pressures to structure agricultural trade in a way that decreases trade tensions, promotes trade access for developing economies and offers value for taxpayer’s money, the EU and the US should be aiming to reach agreement on their shared objectives.

Sechler, Susan & Thurston, Jack. The Shared Farm Policy Agenda in Brussels and Washington. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 27 May 2005.

back to contents

The United States and International Affairs

‘Publicists for Jihad’

David Frum

Since the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the media have been publicising a great deal about how the Islamic communities in Britain are being affected by anti-Western preaching emanating from some mosques across the United Kingdom. David Frum hypothesizes that these same Islamic communities are being affected similarly by the anti-Western perspectives being disseminated by mainstream European media services.

According to Frum, in the aftermath of the London attacks, British journalists have worked to publish quotes from disaffected young Muslims, many of who protest of a Western “doubled standard” that reviles the killing of innocents in London while overlooking the killing of innocents in Iraq. When these young Muslims view images of murder and destruction in Iraq, they somehow do not blame the actual perpetrators, but instead blame the nations and armed forces working to protect Iraqi citizens.

David Frum argues that while this “blindness is largely self-inflicted, it is surely worsened by the willingness of much of the European media” to pander to deep-seated anti-Americanism. There are sufficient issues to be debated around the conduct of the war in Iraq without operating as the Jihadists’ publicists and “without distributing false stories and denigrating the work and sacrifice of coalition forces in Iraq.”

The concern in the UK and elsewhere is that Iraq has now become a metaphor for local resentment. When the Western media blame and criticize the decisions of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, “they do not appease the angry people in their midst: they emen them.”

Frum, David. Publicists for Jihad. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 26 July 2005.

back to top

‘Giving Justice Its Due’

George Perkovich

George W Bush’s second inaugural speech put the advancement of freedom at the heart of US foreign policy. According to George Perkovich, President Bush is only half right to proclaim the spread of freedom as the key objective of US foreign policy; “the pursuit of justice is just as important.”

Widening the gamut would not only reflect the Untied States’ historical political tradition more fully, but it would also work to counterbalance resistance from radical Islamic extremists and critics of globalisation.

Opponents of Bush’s attempt to put ethics at the centre of US foreign policy were misguided, mainly because such ideas have informed an important element of foreign policy debates since the founding of the nation. Instead, what they should have criticised was the narrow focus of the administration's focus on the principle of political freedom, in isolation from other elements of the American creed. After all, the Pledge of Allegiance assures not only liberty, but justice too.

Worldwide the United States is faced with opposition to its foreign policy strategies and economic predominance. Perkovich argues that today much of this opposition comes from either radical Islamists or from those who blame the US administration for policies that either create or enhance global inequities and the destabilising consequences of globalisation. Consequently, if the US fails to address the issue of injustice around the world, its policies will be discredited and its influence will wane. In order to alleviate this possibility and advance its foreign policy interests, the US must be concerned that justice is done and is seen to be done.

As Hedley Bull argues in his study The Anarchical Society “any regime that provides order in world politics will need to appease demands for just change, at least to some degree, if it is to endure; and thus an enlightened pursuit of the goal of order will take account also of the demand for justice.” Perkovich opines that unjust policies breed resistance and dissonance.

In conclusion, Perkovich notes that in “complex political situations, perfect justice can neither be defined nor achieved.”

However, egregious injustice can be spotted in an instant. As the world’s only superpower, the US must be seen to lead the fight against injustice, while also maintaining the strategic goal of spreading liberty.

Perkovich, George. Giving Justice Its Due, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

back to contents

‘America’s new UN envoy: lethal injection, or healthy tonic?

The Economist

The recent decision by President Bush to circumvent the Senate and send John Bolton to the United Nations as US Ambassador has received criticism from many quarters. The recess appointment, though legal, has left many outraged by what they considered a devious decision. The minority leader in the Senate, Harry Reid, called the recess appointment “the latest abuse of power” by the Republican White House. Moreover, even some in the Republican Party consider Ambassador Bolton’s position seriously diminished in the absence of bipartisan Senate approval.

Despite Mr Bolton’s unambiguous contempt for the United Nations - he was once reported as saying that “it wouldn’t make a bit of difference”

if the UN secretariat building in New York were to lose ten storeys – his appointment is creating a mixture of different opinions. Many UN officials fear that his appointment is a clear indication of the US administration's desire to weaken and perhaps even kill off the troubled organisation. Others maintain that Mr. Bolton is precisely what the UN needs – a good “kick up the pants.”

Overall, many remain cautious of his appointment. The Bush administration maintains that most of the UN reforms that are due to be signed off on at this months meeting of the General Assembly, are too near completion for Ambassador Bolton to interfere with. However, according to an acquaintance of Mr. Bolton “Unilateralists, like Bolton, don’t really want to destroy the UN; they just want to control it or paralyse it if it doesn’t do what the US wants.”

‘America’s new UN envoy: lethal injection or healthy tonic?’ was taken from The Economist, August 6th -12th, 2005.

back to contents

‘Regime Change and Its Limits’

Richard N. Hass

Over recent years, the policy of ‘regime change’ has gained considerable support in Washington as a legitimate foreign policy tool. A policy that many argue is less distasteful than conducting diplomatic niceties with States like Iran and North Korea and less dangerous than living with new rogue nuclear States. Richard Hass argues that the Bush administration needs to rethink its policy of ‘regime change,’ for it is unlikely to have the desired effect. Instead, a much broader approach, involving talks, sanctions, and the threat of force, is required.

The policy of ‘regime change’ is nothing new. Indeed, the Roosevelt administration chose to deal with Germany and Japan through a policy of ‘regime change.’ The administration sought not simply to defeat the axis powers, but to continue fighting until the governing authorities of Germany and Japan were ousted and a better alternative installed. This policy took years of armed occupation and intrusive involvement in the internal workings of both countries to achieve its ultimate objective.

US policy toward the Soviet Union after WWII was markedly different, however. This policy, known as ‘containment,’ recommended opposing Moscow’s attempts to spread communism and expand Soviet influence internationally. But it also had a second, less cited component; a component that espoused the policy of ‘regime change.’ According to George Kennan (a former US diplomat in Moscow) who helped formulate the policy of ‘containment,’ it was “entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement” and “to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”

Hass maintains that this second policy could be seen as ‘regime evolution.’ Unlike the current administration’s understanding of ‘regime change,’ which involves the use of military force, as well as attempts to isolate both diplomatically and economically the State in question, ‘regime evolution’ is inclined to be indirect and gradual and to involve the use of foreign policy tools other than military force. ‘Regime evolution’ accepts the need for give and take. And although taking more than 40 years to succeed, it eventually achieved its strategic goals in the USSR.

The Cold War experience holds important lessons for current US foreign policy. Removing abhorrent leaders is no simple undertaking. The USSR lasted more than seventy-five years. Notably, ‘regime replacement’ is even more difficult. By using the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 as a yardstick, it becomes obvious that attempts to establish a viable government have been considerably more difficult than the military removal of Saddam Hussein. Of course, there is no reason to believe that a military occupation elsewhere will be any less troublesome.

Indeed, Hass argues that “the uncertainties surrounding regime change make it an unreliable approach for dealing with specific problems such as nuclear weapons programs in an unfriendly State.”

An alternative policy for meeting the nuclear challenge posed by Iran and North Korea would be to emphasize diplomacy. The carrot-and-stick approach to diplomacy may prove more effective than the military option. Nevertheless, if Iran and North Korea do not cooperate sufficiently, diplomatic and economic sanctions, and ultimately military intervention, need to be available.

Hass maintains that while ‘regime change,’ limited military action, diplomacy, and deterrence can all be considered as alternative policies, they are better understood as elements of a single comprehensive approach toward States like Iran and North Korea. Nonetheless, Hass believes that diplomacy should be at the heart of US policy toward both countries. Dr. Hass contends that a “foreign policy that chooses to integrate, not isolate, despotic regimes, can be the Trojan horse that moderates their behaviour in the short term and their nature in the long term.”

Hass, Richard N. Regime Change and Its Limits, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005.

back to top

Transatlantic Affairs Editor: Frank Groome

If you have any comments or suggestions to improve this service please contact the editor at frank.groom@ucd.ie

The William Jefferson Clinton Institute for American Studies at University College Dublin www.ucd.ie/amerstud